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STATEMENT REGARDING RELATED CASES
This matter was originally appealed and heard by the Utah Court of Appeals in
2005. Case No. 20050246-CA (Utah DepL of Tramp, v. Ivers, 128 P3d 74 (Utah App.
2005)). Following the Utah Court of Appeals' decision, this Court granted Arby's Petition
for Writ of Certiorari. Case No. 20060061-SC (Ivers v. Utah DepL ofTransp., 154 R3d
802 (Utah 2007)).
STATEMENT OE JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-22(3)(j). Pursuant to its May 8, 2008 Order, this Court elected to retain this appeal on its
docket and vacate its order of transfer to the Utah Court of Appeals.
IDENTIFICATION OE THE PARTIES
Petitioners are James Ivers, Katherine G. Havas, and P and F Food Services,
referred to herein collectively as "Arby's."

Respondent is Utah Department of

Transportation, referred to herein as "UDOT."
STATEMENT OE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review are stated as follows:
ISSUE:

1

Did the trial court violate the mandate of the Utah
Supreme Court on remand by foreclosing Arby's right

Utah's Judicial Code was recodified by the Utah Legislature during the 2008 legislative
session. This statute is now found at UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-3-102(j).
1

to seek severance damages for loss of view based upon
new arguments raised by UDOT?
ISSUE:

Did the trial court err in its interpretation and
application of UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2)2 to
permit UDOT to amend its condemnation complaint to
exclude appurtenant rights from its taking in an effort
to avoid paying severance damages for loss of view
after the view had already been taken?

ISSUE:

Due to the delays in this matter caused by UDOT's
approach in raising new arguments, is it appropriate to
value Arby's damages currently as opposed to when
Arby's was served with process of this condemnation
action six years ago?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Upon remand, a trial court is required to comply with the mandate of an appellate
court. Street v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, Utah County, 191 P.2d, 153, 157 (Utah
1948),
The appellate court reviews the district court's ruling for correctness, granting no
deference to its legal conclusions. Woodbury Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 73 P.3d
362, 364 (Utah 2003). See also Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70 P.3d 72, 75 (Utah
2003); Smith v. Smith, 793 P,2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990).

Due to the recodification of the Judicial Code, this statute has renumbered as UTAH
CODE ANN. §78B-6-512(2). For convenience, a copy of this statute is attached hereto as
Addendum A.
2

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law appellate courts review for
correctness. See, e.g., Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 173 P.3d 166, 168 (Utah
2007).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
•

Article I, Section 22, Utah Constitution:

"Private property shall not be

taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." (Emphasis added).
•

UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-10:3
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as
may be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and
thereupon must ascertain and assess:

(2)
if the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which
will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by
reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff

3

Due to the recent recodification of the Utah Judicial Code, this statute was renumbered
as UTAH C O D E A N N . §78B-6-511.

This introductory sentence has been amended slightly and now reads as follows: "The
courts, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered by any of the parties to the
proceedings, and determine and assess...." UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-511.
3

(2)
if the property, though no part is taken, will be
damaged by the construction of the proposed improvement,
the amount of such damages;
(3)
separately, how much the portion not sought to
be condemned...will be benefited, if at all, by the
construction of the improvement proposed by the plaintiff....
(Emphasis added).
•

UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-11(1):5
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto
shall be deemed to have occurred at the date of the service of summons....

•

UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2):
The court or the jury shall consider mitigation or reduction of damages in its
assessment of compensation and damages if, after the date of the service of
summons, the plaintiff:
(a)
(b)

mitigates the damages to the property; or
reduces the amount of property actually taken.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

Nature of the Case
Prior to UDOT's construction project that is the subject of this case, Arby's had

operated a restaurant for many years on the northwest corner of a busy intersection

5

Pursuant to the 2008 recodification of the Utah Judicial Code, UTAH CODE ANN. §7834-11(1) has been renumbered as UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-512(l).
4

located at U.S. 89 and Shepard Lane in a commercial area of Farmington, Utah. This
case involves Arby's claims for severance damages suffered in connection with a partial
taking of Arby's property for incorporation into UDOT's construction project. UDOT's
project involved the elimination of the U.S. 89/Shepard Lane intersection by elevating
U.S. 89 over Shepard Lane. The portion of UDOT's expansion and elevation project
built adjacent to Arby's remaining property blocks the property's view to the east. Arby's
right to seek severance damages for loss of view was recognized by this Court in its prior
ruling in this matter. See Ivers v. Utah Dept. of Tramp., 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007). For
convenience, a copy of this Court's prior decision is attached hereto as Addendum B.
II.

Course of Proceedings
Following the Utah Court of Appeals' ruling in favor of UDOT, the issue of

whether Arby's could pursue severance damages for loss of view was presented to the
Utah Supreme Court on certiorari review. The Supreme Court held that a property owner
has a protectable easement in the view from his property that cannot be taken without just
compensation. Ivers, 154 P.2d at 805, 806-807. With respect to this specific case, the
Court held severance damages are appropriate where a portion of property is condemned
by the state and the condemnation of that land causes damage to the remnant portion of

6

The Utah Court of Appeals' opinion is found at Utah Dept. of Tramp, v. Ivers, 128
P.3d 74 (Utah App. 2005).
5

the land. Id, at 807, According to this Court, Arby's is entitled to severance damages for
loss of view if the "view-impairing structure is built on land other then the condemned
land, but the condemned land is used as part of a single project and that use is essential to
completion of the project." Id. at 808 (emphasis in original).
The case was remanded to the district court for an initial determination of whether
the taking was essential to UDOT's project. Following the remand, UDOT admitted its
taking of Arby's property was essential to the project. This left the amount of damages as
the only issue for trial. However, before the case could be tried, UDOT filed a motion in
limine seeking to preclude Arby's severance damages claim on a basis never before raised
in the six year history of this case. UDOT's motion in limine asserted access deeds
executed by Arby's predecessors in interest could be interpreted to mean that any and all
appurtenant rights, including the right of view, had been relinquished years before Arby's
acquired its interest in the property. The trial court denied UDOT's motion in limine as
an untimely motion to amend its complaint.
Following the denial of UDOT's motion in limine, UDOT filed another request to
alter or amend the trial court's order, UDOT's request to alter or amend included a
passing reference to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2), which had never been cited
previously in this matter. UDOT argued this statute gave it the right to amend its taking
at any time during the course of the proceedings. Although not fully explained in its
6

briefing to the trial court, UDOT's argument appeared to be that it could use UTAH CODE
ANN. §78-34-11(2) to unilaterally remove appurtenant rights from the scope of its taking,
thereby eliminating Arby's claim for severance damages for loss of view.
III.

Disposition in the Lower Court
Upon consideration of UDOT's request to alter or amend, the trial court agreed

with UDOT that pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2), UDOT is free at any time
to amend its condemnation complaint to modify the scope of the property right it seeks to
take. Therefore, the trial court was willing to treat the condemnation complaint in this
case as amended to exclude any taking of appurtenant rights, including loss of view.
Based upon this ruling, the trial court determined that because UDOT was dropping any
claim that it was actually taking any of Arby's appurtenant right, Arby's was precluded
from seeking severance damages for loss of view. Because of the trial court's ruling,
Arby's filed a motion for leave to amend its pleadings to add a counterclaim against
UDOT. In response, the trial court entered a notice stating that due to Arby's appeal, it
does not have jurisdiction to decide Arby's motion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The underlying facts are set forth in the parties' briefing and the Utah Supreme
Court's prior ruling in Case No. 20060061-SC (Ivers, 154 P. 3d 802, Addendum E
hereto). The facts related to the present appeal are as follows:
7

1.

UDOT filed its Complaint in this action on December 20, 2002, seeking to

condemn a portion of Arby's real property. Complaint, R at pp. 1-12 (the record on
appeal is referred to herein as "R").
2.

UDOT's Complaint, in identifying the property to be condemned, referred

to the Condemnation Resolution attached to the Complaint Condemnation Resolution,
R a t pp. 5-8.
3.

The

Condemnation

Resolution

contains

the

following

provision

immediately following the metes and bounds description of the parcel UDOT sought to
take from Arby's:
To enable [UDOT] to construct and maintain a public
highway...the owners of said entire tract of property hereby
release and relinquish to said [UDOT] any and all rights
appurtenant to the remaining property of said owners by
reason of the location thereof with reference to said
highway....
Id. at p. 7.
4.

Arby's seeks severance damages in this case due to the view-impairing

obstruction caused by UDOT's construction project.
5.

On February 6, 2007, the Utah Supreme Court entered its decision on

severance damages in the prior appeal, and held as follows:
A property owner does... have a protectable easement in the
view from his property.
8

With respect to lost view, severance damages are appropriate
under Utah Code Section 78-34-10 where a portion of
property is condemned by the state and the condemnation of
that land causes damage to the noncondemned portion of the
land. Damage to the noncondemned portion of the land is
'caused' by the severance in two situations: (1) when the
view-impairing structure is built on the condemned land, or
(2) when the view-impairing structure is built on land other
than the condemned land, but the condemned land is used as
part of a single project and that use is essential to completion
of the project.
Ivers, 154 P.3d at 807-808 (emphasis in original).
6.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for "proceedings

consistent with this opinion." Id. at 808.
7.

Upon remand of the case to the trial court, UDOT, in a response to Arby's

request for admissions, admitted its taking was essential to the construction project.
Plaintiffs Response to Request for Admissions, Addendum C hereto,
8.

On April 30, 2007, UDOT filed a motion in limine asserting Arby's had no

appurtenant property rights (including view rights), due to language in certain access
deeds that had been executed by prior property owners. UDOT's Motion in Limine and
Memorandum in Support, R. at pp. 314-348. This argument was never made previously.
February 5, 2008 Ruling ("February Ruling"), R. at p. 463. A copy of the February Ruling
9

is also attached hereto for convenience as Addendum D.
9.

UDOT's briefing in support of its motion in limine made no reference to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-34-11(2).

UDOT's Memorandum in Support of Motion in

Limine, R. at pp. 317-326.
10.

The trial court entered a ruling on October 18, 2007, holding UDOT's

motion in limine was an untimely motion to amend pleadings. October 18, 2007 Ruling
("October Ruling"), R. at p. 394. A copy of the October Ruling is also attached hereto as
convenience as Addendum E.
11.

On October 30, 2007, UDOT filed a request to alter or amend the trial

court's October Ruling. The following statement constitutes UDOT's entire argument
under UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2):
As a matter of public policy, a Utah condemning authority has
an absolute right to avoid, mitigate or reduce damages by
amending or changing the take to either mitigate or reduce
damages. The mitigation or change of take can occur any
time after service of summons and before the jury assessment
of compensation and damages.
Request to Alter or Amend Order, R. at p. 403.
12.

On February 5, 2008, the trial court entered its ruling providing that

pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2), UDOT is free, without leave of court, to
amend its taking at any time and that by removing any claim for taking of appurtenant
10

rights, Arby's could no longer pursue its claim for damages for loss of view. The trail
court held:
Because this statute allows UDOT to amend its taking, it
naturally follows that UDOT can amend the complaint at any
time, and so the Court's denial of the motion in limine was
improper. Because UDOT has that authority, it can now
assert that it is not seeking to condemn the rights of view...
and Arby's should be precluded from submitting any evidence
that it owns a right of view.
February Ruling ("February Ruling"), R. at p. 470. (Addendum D at p. 8).
13.

The trial court's February 5, 2008 ruling also contains the following

language:
The Court notes that UDOT did not raise that argument in its
original motion or its reply memorandum, and so the Court
was unaware of [UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2)].
Throughout this case, and especially since remand, UDOT has
proceeded with a strategy of 'shifting theories', in which it
first raises what it believes to be winning arguments, but
neglects to raise additional arguments that it believes have
merit. When the initial arguments fail, UDOT then falls back
to a different theory. This is another example of that strategy.
The Court finds UDOT's approach of 'shifting theories' is
inappropriate, and has wasted valuable resources....
As noted above, UDOT did not cite to Utah Code Ann. §7834-11(2) until after the Court had issued its ruling. Normally,
the Court would be hesitant to consider the issue, since it
should have raised it earlier. However, the fact remains little
or nothing would be gained by allowing this matter to proceed
to trial only to have any potential judgment in favor or Arby's
11

reversed on appeal.
Id. at pp. 469-470. (Addendum D at pp. 7-8).
14.

On or about March 27, 2008, Arby's filed a motion with the trial court

asking for leave to file a counterclaim against UDOT for inverse condemnation as a result
of the trial court's ruling precluding Arby's from recovering severance damages. Motion
for Leave to File Counterclaim, R. at pp. 477-482.
15.

Due to the present appeal, the trial court notified the parties it had no

jurisdiction to rule upon Arby's Motion for Leave to File Counterclaim.

Notice to

Parties, R. at pp. 516-517.
SUMMARY OF ARBY'S ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court remanded this case to the district court for a
determination of whether UDOT's taking of Arby's property was essential to its project,
and if so, the amount of severance damages for Arby's loss of view. The trial court is
required to abide strictly with the appellate court's mandate.

However, rather than

proceeding as directed by this Court, the district court entertained UDOT's post-remand
motions, containing never-before-raised legal arguments, and ultimately interpreted UTAH
CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2) to allow UDOT to unilaterally modify its pleadings to exclude
loss of view as part of UDOT's taking.

12

Based upon its own interpretation of the legal impact of UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3411(2), UDOT has manipulated its taking to exclude any taking of appurtenant rights, such
as right of view. This attempt to extinguish any claim Arby's has for severance damages
is made long after UDOT's project has been constructed, blocking Arby's view to the
east.

It is also inconsistent with this Court's prior ruling supported by the Utah

Constitution and the severance damages statute.

UDOT cannot defeat a severance

damages claim based upon the construction of a thirty-foot elevated highway merely by
adjusting the language of a pleading. The trial court erred in interpreting and applying
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2) in a manner that excuses UDOT from paying severance
damages to Arby's for its loss of view.
The delays caused by UDOT's tactics in making piece-meal arguments justify a
departure from the general rule that damages are to be determined as of the date the
condemnation complaint is served. The delays in this case require a current date be used
to evaluate damages inasmuch as property values have increased since this case was
commenced six years ago.

13

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT'S MANDATE UPON REMAND
A reading of this Court's February 6, 2007 opinion in this matter makes it clear the
issue that was remanded to the trial court for an initial determination whether the taking
of Arby's property was "essential" to UDOT's project.

Ivers, 154 P.3d at 808.

According to the opinion, whether the taking was essential "is a factual matter yet to be
resolved." Id, Following remand, Arby's propounded requests for admissions to UDOT.
Responding to those requests for admissions, UDOT admitted the partial taking of Arby's
property was essential to the subject construction project. Addendum C hereto.
With UDOT's admission, the only issue left for determination was the amount of
severance damages for Arby's loss of view. However, instead of scheduling a proceeding
to determine damages, the trial court interpreted a never-before-cited statute (UTAH

CODE

ANN. §78-34-11(2)) to permit UDOT to unilaterally remove from its condemnation
complaint any taking of appurtenant rights.

With that, the trial court considered

appurtenant rights omitted from this case and determined there is no longer any basis for
Arby's to seek severance damages under UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-10 for loss of view.
According to the trial court's order, "there are no other matters to be addressed by this
14

Court, and the case is resolved." February Ruling, R. at p. 471. (Addendum D at p. 9).
It is well settled that "when a case has been determined by a reviewing court and
remanded to the trial court, the duty of the latter is to comply with the mandate of the
former." Street v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, Utah, 191 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah 1948).
This mandate is binding on the trial court "and must be strictly followed and carried into
effect...." Id. The Utah Supreme Court has already held if UDOT's taking of Arby's
property was "essential" to the subject construction project, it could be awarded
compensation for lost view. Upon remand, the trial court should not "permit amended or
supplemental pleadings to be framed to try rights already settled." Id. at 158.
The trial court failed to follow its mandate in this matter. Now that UDOT has
admitted the taking was essential, the trial court should be instructed to promptly schedule
a trial to determine the amount of damages.
POINT 2
SECTION 78-34-11(2) SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED
TO ALLOW UDOT TO AVOID ITS LIABILTY
FOR SEVERANCE DAMAGES
Arby's was required to go through a lengthy appeal and certiorari review process
to protect its constitutional rights and finally establish its right to pursue severance
damages for loss of view. However, upon remand, UDOT proceeded with its practice of
raising brand new arguments in an effort to avoid paying Arby's just compensation,
15

UDOT was successful in convincing the trial court to incorrectly interpret and apply
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2) to once again deny Arby's its constitutional rights.
Although reluctant to permit UDOT to engage in its strategic use of "shifting theories"
and piece-meal arguments in this case, the trial court agreed with UDOT's strained
interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2). This statute wasn't presented to the
trial court until after the trial court had already denied its post-remand motion in limine as
an untimely motion to amend pleadings. Even then, UDOT provided the trial court with
no analysis of how the statute could be legitimately used to trump UTAH CODE ANN. §7834-10 to avoid paying a severance damages claim. The statute was cited and discussed,
without any analysis, in merely four and a half lines of UDOT's request to amend.
UDOT's Request to Alter or Amend Order, R. at p. 403.
In evaluating the trial court's application of UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2), it is
important to focus on the actual statutory language. The statute provides:
The Court or the jury shall consider mitigation or reduction of
damages in its assessment of compensation and damages if,
after the date of summons, [UDOT]:
(a) mitigates the damages to the property; or
(b) reduces the amount of property actually taken.
According to the trial court, pursuant to this statute, the condemning authority can
modify its taking any time it wants after service of the summons, without requiring leave
16

of court. February Ruling, R. at p. 469. (Addendum D at p. 7).7 The trial court equates
the right to modify a taking under UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2) with the right to
amend pleadings. By modifying its complaint to remove any taking of loss of view, the
trial court considers Arby's claim for severance damages terminated.
It is well settled that when interpreting a statute, the goal is to ascertain the
legislature's intent. Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 179 P.3d 768, 774 (Utah 2008). The
court does this "by first evaluating 'the best evidence' of legislative intent, namely, 4the
plain language of the statute itself."' Id, (footnote omitted). Statutory words are given
their "'plain, natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, in the absence of any
statutory or well-established technical meaning, unless it is plain from the statute that a
different meaning is intended,'" Id, (footnote omitted). Moreover, "it is axiomatic that a
statute should be given a reasonable and sensible construction." State of Utah v. GAF
Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted).

UDOT's desire to amend pleadings is based upon its interpretation of prior access deeds
executed by Arby's predecessors in interest and involving projects and property other
than what is involved in the present dispute. UDOT's never-before-raised theory is that
any and all conceivable appurtenant rights have already been relinquished to UDOT
through these prior access deeds that had nothing to do with the construction project at
issue in the present matter. However, in the February Ruling, the trial court did not rule
upon the legal effect of these prior access deeds. It merely agreed with UDOT that,
without leave of court, it was free to amend its taking at any time pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. §78-34-11(2). Order, Addendum F hereto.
17

Neither UDOT nor the trial court has provided any analysis to show how, under
the plain meaning of UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2), the statute can be used in such a
broad manner so as to defeat a severance damages claim, particularly after the damage
o

has already been inflicted upon a property owner.

It is clear the statute's purpose is to

assure awards in condemnation cases reflect any mitigation of damages due to a reduction
in the amount of property actually condemned or for other reasons. The element of
mitigation is not present here. For example, UDOT has not removed the obstruction or
done anything to mitigate the impact of the obstruction on Arby's loss of view from its
property. Moreover, UDOT has not given back to Arby's any of the property it took.
UDOT has already paid Arby's compensation for the parcel that was condemned.
Furthermore, this Court has already ruled a property owner has a claim for damages
"when the view impaired structure is built on land other than the condemned land, but the
condemned land is used as part of a single project and that use is essential to completion
of the project." Ivers, 154 P.3d at 808. What remains is Arby's severance damages claim
for lost view under UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-10.9
This argument is metaphysical in nature. The thirty-foot elevated highway exists,
regardless of how UDOT wishes to characterize its pleadings.
Additionally, there is simply nothing in the statute to indicate the legislature intended to
override the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in connection with the timeliness of seeking
amendments to pleadings generally. Prior to UDOT's citation to UTAH CODE ANN. §7818

Even if UDOT wants to make a form over substance argument that removing
appurtenant rights from its taking forecloses Arby's severance damages claim, it does not
magically undo the damage that has been caused to Arby's by virtue of the viewimpairing structure built immediately east of Arby's remnant property. Arby's continues
to have its severance damages claim for loss of view under UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-10,
even if the condemnation claim is deemed amended. The view has been taken no matter
how UDOT wants to word its condemnation complaint or describe its taking. UTAH
CODE ANN. §78-34-11(2) should not be allowed to give a condemning authority the
ability to sidestep a property owner's constitutional rights by amending its complaint in
reaction to what it considers an unfavorable ruling by the appellate court. That is why
Arby's sought to add a counterclaim for inverse condemnation after the trial court
rejected the severance damages claim.
In short, it has been established through admissions that the property UDOT took
from Arby's was essential to the construction project. There is no dispute the U.S. 89
overpass UDOT built damages Arby's by obstructing Arby's view to the east. Therefore,
according to the analysis contained in this Court's prior ruling, the trial court should be

34-11(2), the trial court had appropriately determined UDOT's efforts constituted an
untimely motion to amend pleadings. October Ruling, R. at p. 394. (Addendum E at p.
9).
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reversed and the issue of severance damages should proceed to trial.
POINT 3
THE DATE OF VALUATION SHOULD BE ADJUSTED DUE TO DELAYS IN
ARBY'S ABILITY TO OBTAIN COMPENSATION FOR ITS LOST VIEW

Although the trial court apparently felt compelled to apply UTAH CODE ANN. §7834-11(2) the way it did, the court's ruling expressed concern about UDOT's tactics during
the course of this litigation. For example, the court observed that throughout this case,
UDOT has proceeded with a strategy of 'shifting theories,' in
which it first raises what it believes to be winning arguments,
but neglects to raise additional arguments that it believes has
merit. When the initial arguments fail, UDOT then falls back
to a different theory.
February Ruling, R. at p. 469. (Addendum D at p. 7).
The trial court then goes on to say that it finds UDOT's "shifting theories"
approach "inappropriate" and that it has wasted valuable resources. Id.
This action has gone on for six years now with UDOT successfully delaying
Arby's ability to be compensated. Even the trial court has recognized UDOT's tactics
have been inappropriate. Arby's shouldn't be required to suffer as a result. Based upon
this, in addition to reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court should rule that pursuant
to the rationale of the plurality in Utah State Road Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821
(Utah 1984), the point in time Arby's damages are calculated should be moved to a
20

current date, rather that set at the time the complaint was served back in 2002.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court should reverse the trial court's
ruling. The case should be remanded for a determination of Arby's damages.
Respectfully submitted this \0

day of July, 2008.
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§78-34-10

JUDICIAL CODE

Note 48
peal complain that the court did not so charge,
for under Comp. Laws 1917, § 6803, a party, if
desiring more specific instructions than those
given, should request them. Salt Lake & U.R.
Co. v. Schramm, 1920, 56 Utah 53, 189 P. 90.
Eminent Domain ©=> 255
Where there is ample evidence in support of
verdict in proceedings to condemn land, Supreme Court cannot review evidence respecting
amount allowed by jury. Ogden, L. & L Ry. Co.
v. Jones, 1917, 51 Utah 62, 168 P. 548. Eminent Domain <£=> 262(4)
In proceedings to condemn land, where no
demurrer was interposed to complaint, and no
objection respecting its sufficiency made either
before or during trial, defect that complaint
failed to state that attempted condemnation proceedings were authorized as required by statute,
being jurisdictional, was not waived. Town of
Tremonton v. Johnston, 1917, 49 Utah 307, 164
P. 190. Eminent Domain <£=> 255
In condemnation proceedings, improper elicitation of remote testimony of owner of land on
cross-examination held harmless to his substantial rights. Town of Tremonton v. Johnston,
1917, 49 Utah 307, 164 P. 190. Eminent Domain <&* 262(5)
Refusal to strike out testimony of witness in
condemnation proceeding as to elements considered by him in arriving at his estimate of
defendant's damages held harmless, where the
motion would not have resulted in striking out

the estimate, but merely his reasons, especially
in view of the court's instructions
Teliuride
Power Co. v. Bruneau, 1912, 41 Utah 4, 125 P.
399, Am.Ann.Cas. 1915A,1251. Appeal And Err o r ^ 1047(3)
49. New trial
Trial court did not act improperly in ordering
new trial in condemnation proceeding unless
owner would consent to a remittitur. Utah
State Road Commission v. Johnson, 1976, 550
P.2d 216. Eminent Domain <&> 224
Where landowner was improperly allowed to
testify that property was worth $120,000 to
$125,000 while highest value given by an expert
witness was $92,000, and jury awarded
$95,000, conditioning new trial on owner's consent to remittitur in amount of $3,000 did not
cure the error; rather, new trial was required.
Utah State Road Commission v. Johnson, 1976,
550 P.2d 216. Eminent Domain <£=> 224
Where even after reduction the severance
damages to grazing land not taken amounted to
$3 per acre more than jury had fixed as value of
the better land taken, trial court abused its
discretion in not granting the state a new trial
since verdict showed that it was given either
under influence of passion and prejudice or
under a lack of understanding of the law.
U.C.A.1953, 78-34-10. State By and Through
Road Commission v. Silliman, 1968, 22 Utah 2d
33, 448 P.2d 347. Eminent Domain <&> 224

§ 78—34—11. Damages—When right deemed to have accrued—Mitigation
or reduction—Improvements
(1) For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right
thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the service of summons,
a n d its actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all
property to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually
taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages are allowed, as
provided in Section 78-34-10.
(2) The court or the jury shall consider mitigation or reduction of damages in
its assessment of compensation and damages if, after the date of the service of
s u m m o n s , the plaintiff:
(a) mitigates the damages to the property; or
(b) reduces the a m o u n t of property actually taken.
(3) Improvements put upon the property by the property owner subsequent
to the date of service of summons shall not be included in the assessment of
compensation or damages.
Laws 1951, c. 58, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 20, § 170, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 2002, c. 156,
§ l.eff. May 6, 2002.
Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 104-34-11.
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Hlvers v. Utah Dept. of Transp.
Utah,2007.
Supreme Court of Utah.
James IVERS; Katherine G. Havas; and P and F
Food Services, Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 2006006L
Feb. 6,2007.
Background: Department of Transportation (DOT)
brought eminent domain action, seeking to acquire
portion of restaurant's lot to widen highway. The
Second District Court, Farmington Department,
Michael G. Allphin, J., denied restaurant's motion for
partial summary judgment and granted DOT's motion
in limine to preclude admission of evidence
concerning severance damages. Restaurant appealed,
and the Court of Appeals, 128 P.3d 74, affirmed.
Restaurant petitioned for writ of certiorari.
Holdings: The Supreme Court granted the petition,
and the Court, Wilkins, Associate C J., held that, as a
matter of first impression:
(1) restaurant did not have a protected property right
in visibility of its property from roadway, but
(2) restaurant potentially had claim for severance
damages due to loss of view if taken strip was
essential to the highway project.
Affirmed in part and remanded.
West Headnotes

Ui Certiorari 73 > > - / ™ w 64(1)
73 Certiorari
73II Proceedings and Determination
73k63 Review
73k64 Scope and Extent in General
73k64(l) k. In General. Most Cited
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Cases
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the
decision of the court of appeals and not that of the
trial court.

121 Eminent Domain 148

€=^

107

148 Eminent Domain
148II Compensation
14811(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k94 Elements of Compensation for
Injuries to Property Not Taken
148kl07 k. Interference with Trade or
Business. Most Cited Cases
Restaurant did not have a protected property right in
visibility of its property from roadway, even though
part of restaurant's land had been taken by
Department of Transportation (DOT), and thus
visibility was not compensable for eminent domain
purposes; claim was essentially a claim for
compensation for lost business profits. West's U.C.A.
Const. Art L § 22; West's U C.A. § 78-34-10.

[31 Eminent Domain 148

€^>

105

148 Eminent Domain
148II Compensation
14811(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k94 Elements of Compensation for
Injuries to Property Not Taken
148kl05 k. Obstruction of Light or Air.
Most Cited Cases
Landowners do not have a protected interest in the
visibility of their property from an abutting road,
even if part of their land has been taken in the
process. West's U.CA. Const. Art. U 22; West's
U.C.A. $ 78-34-10.

[41 Eminent Domain 148

€^>
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148 Eminent Domain
14811 Compensation
14811(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k94 Elements of Compensation for
Injuries to Property Not Taken
148kl05 k. Obstruction of Light or Air.
Most Cited Cases
A property owner has no recognized property right to
free and unrestricted visibility of his property by
passing traffic, and an impairment of that visibility
through a condemnation does not mandate
compensation. West's U.C.A. Const Art. 1, § 22;
West's U.C.A. $ 78-34-10.

|5| Easements 141

C^>

141 Easements
1411 Creation, Existence, and Termination
141k2 k. Subject-Matter and Parties in
General. Most Cited Cases
An easement of view from one's property is a
protectable property right. West's U.C.A. Const. Art.
L § 22; West's U.C.A. § 72-6-117(5).

i6\ Eminent Domain 148

€^>

105

148 Eminent Domain
148II Compensation
14811(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k94 Elements of Compensation for
Injuries to Property Not Taken
148kl05 k. Obstruction of Light or Air.
Most Cited Cases
Severance damages are clearly awardable when the
state condemns a portion of land and builds a
structure directly on that condemned land, impairing
the view from, and thereby causing damage to, the
non-condemned portion of land. West's U.C.A.
Const. Art. 1,5 22; West's U.C.A. $ 72-6-117(5).

17] Eminent Domain 148
148 Eminent Domain
148II Compensation

€=>

105
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14811(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k94 Elements of Compensation for
Injuries to Property Not Taken
148kl05 k. Obstruction of Light or Air.
Most Cited Cases
When land is condemned as part of a single projecteven if the view-impairing structure itself is built on
property other than that which was condemned-if the
use of the condemned property is essential to the
completion of the project as a whole, the property
owner is entitled to severance damages for the
impaired view; however, if the project could have
been completed without taking the severed land, the
property owner is not entitled to damage to his view
caused by construction that takes place entirely
beyond the borders of his land. West's U.C.A. Const.
Art. L § 22; West's U.C.A. g 72-6-117(5).

[8] Eminent Domain 148

x

-

/

^ ^ 105

148 Eminent Domain
148II Compensation
14811(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k94 Elements of Compensation for
Injuries to Property Not Taken
148kl05 k. Obstruction of Light or Air.
Most Cited Cases
The condemned land is "essential" to the project such
that the landowner may recover severance damages
for loss of view only if its use is such a critical part of
the project that without the taking, the project could
not have been completed. West's U.C.A. Const. Art.
L § 22; Wesfs U.C.A. § 72-6-117(5).

[91 Eminent Domain 148

€=>

105

148 Eminent Domain
148II Compensation
14811(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k94 Elements of Compensation for
Injuries to Property Not Taken
148k 105 k. Obstruction of Light or Air.
Most Cited Cases
Restaurant, which had part of its land condemned by
Department of Transportation (DOT), potentially had
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claim for severance damages due to loss of view if
taken strip, which purportedly had a turning lane,
curb and gutters, landscaping, and a portion of one
lane of the one-way frontage road built on it, was
essential to the DOT's highway project. West's
U.C.A. Const Art. K § 22; West's U.C.A. § 72-6117(5).

[10] Eminent Domain 148 ^-*

105

148 Eminent Domain
14811 Compensation
14811(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k94 Elements of Compensation for
Injuries to Property Not Taken
148klQ5 k. Obstruction of Light or Air.
Most Cited Cases
Severance damages are appropriate in a
condemnation action where a portion of property is
condemned by the state and the condemnation of that
land "causes" damage to the noncondemned portion
of land, which occurs in two situations: (1) when the
view-impairing structure is built on the condemned
land, or (2) when the view-impairing structure is built
on land other than the condemned land, but the
condemned land is used as part of a single project
and that use is essential to completion of the project.
West's U.C.A. Const. Art. 1 J 22; West's U.C.A. §
72-6-117(5).
*803Donald J. Winder, John W Holt, Salt Lake City,
for petitioners.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Brent A. Burnett,
Randy S. Hunter, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City,
for respondent.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice:
f 1 The Utah Department of Transportation
("UDOT") condemned a portion of private property
for the construction of a frontage road adjacent to
U.S. Highway 89 in Farmington, Utah. The
construction of the frontage road was part of a larger
project to widen and elevate Highway 89. Petitioners
James Ivers, {Catherine G. Havas, and P & F Food
Services (collectively, "Arby's") sought severance
damages for loss of view and visibility. The trial
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court granted UDOT's motion in limine, precluding
Arby's from presenting evidence of severance
damages to a jury. Arby's appealed, and the court of
appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari to *804
determine whether article 1, section 22 of the Utah
Constitution permits claims for compensation and
whether Utah Code section 78-34-10 permits
presentation of evidence of damages arising from an
alleged easement for view or visibility, where the
damages to the alleged easement are caused by
construction beyond the boundaries of the
landowner's property. We conclude that since the
raised highway was not built on the condemned land,
unless the use of the condemned land was essential to
the construction of the raised highway, Arby's is not
entitled to damages for loss of view or visibility. We
therefore remand for the necessary factual
determination.

BACKGROUND
f 2 Arby's land is located on the northwest corner of
what was the "intersection of Shephard Lane and
Highway 89 in Farmington, Utah. In order to
decrease the number of accidents, UDOT planned to
eliminate the intersection by elevating Highway 89
over Shephard Lane. In furtherance of this goal, the
State condemned a 0.048-acre portion of Arby's
0.416-acre lot in order to build a one-way frontage
road parallel to, and connecting with, the newly
widened and elevated highway. UDOT agreed to pay
Arby's $48,250 for the condemned property. m
FN1 In addition to the $48,250
compensation originally agreed upon,
UDOT later agreed to pay Arby's $56,250 in
additional compensation for damages caused
by Arby's inability to comply with local
zoning ordinances due to the condemnation
and the highway project.
^ 3 The condemned portion of Arby's property is
located on the south and east edges of the property,
which abut Shephard Lane and Highway 89
respectively. No portion of the raised highway, its
footings, or its foundation was constructed on the
condemned land; rather, the condemned land was
used for the creation of the frontage road and for
improvements to Shephard Lane.
f 4 Although Arby's property is adjacent to Highway
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89, access to the property has historically been
available only by means of Shephard Lane, which
had intersected directly with the highway. After the
project, Shepard Lane no longer connected directly to
Highway 89; rather, the highway is accessed by
frontage roads one-half mile north and one-half mile
south of Shephard Lane. The elevation of the
highway has obstructed both the view to the east
from Arbys land and the visibility of Arbys property
from the highway.

including severance damages, to a jury for a
determination *805 of compensation. Section 78-3410 provides in part the following:

1f 5 Arby's sought severance damages, claiming that
the condemnation, and the pursuant loss of view and
visibility, diminished the market value of their
remaining land.— UDOT filed a motion in limine.
The trial court granted the motion, concluding that
Arby's was precluded from introducing evidence of
damages because the loss of view and visibility arose
from construction on property not actually taken from
them.

(2) if the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages
which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the
portion sought to be condemned and the construction
of the improvement in the manner proposed by the
plaintiff

FN2. Arby's also sought damages for loss of
reasonable access to and from its property.
However, we did not grant review of that
issue.
f 6 Arby's appealed the trial court's decision to the
court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that because the loss of view and visibility
was not caused by the severance or by the
construction of an improvement on the land severed,
Arby's was not entitled to severance damages. We
then granted Arby's petition for a writ of certiorari.
ANALYSIS
0J f 7 On certiorari, we review the decision of the
court of appeals and not that of the trial court. State v.
Brake, 2004 UT 95.1 1 L 103 P.3d 699. Because the
issue before this court is a question of law related to
constitutional and statutory interpretation, we review
the court of appeals' ruling for correctness. Longley v.
Leucadia Fin. Corp., 2000 UT 69. \ 13, 9 P.3d 762.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section
78-2-2(3¥a).
\ 8Article L section 22 of the Utah Constitution
provides, "Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation."
Utah Code section 78-34-10 gives a landowner the
right to present certain evidence of damages,

The court, jury or referee must hear such legal
evidence as may be offered by any of the parties to
the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and
assess:

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (2002).
\ 9 We have held that loss of view is, in certain
situations, an appropriate factor for a jury to consider
in awarding severance damages. In Utah State Road
Commission v. Miya, we held that the "rights of
access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the
land of an abutting owner on a street," and that those
rights "may not be taken away or impaired without
just compensation." 526 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah
1974). We further concluded that an owner of land
abutting a street possesses an "easement of view" that
may not be taken without just compensation. Id. at
929. On the other hand, we have never decided
whether a loss of visibility of property from an
abutting road qualifies for severance damages.
f 10 The question we are now faced with is when, if
ever, an impairment of view or visibility is
compensable where the impairment is caused by a
structure that is built beyond the borders of the
severed land, fn answering this question, we will
address separately Arby's claims for loss of view
from their property and the loss of visibility of their
property.
I. LOSS OF VISIBILITY
[2] \ 11 We have not previously addressed whether a
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landowner has a protectable property interest in the
visibility of his land. For a point of reference, we
look to other jurisdictions1 decisions on the matter.
Where government action impairs visibility but there
is no physical taking of land, "the virtually
unanimous rule provides that there is no freestanding
right to be seen, and that the government need not
pay compensation for lessened visibility." Regency
Outdoor A aver., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 39
CaL4th 507, 517-18, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 742, 139 P.3d
119 (2006). However, when the impairment of
visibility is coupled with a partial taking of land, as is
the case here, there seems to be little consensus from
state to state. While some states recognize an
easement of visibility where an obstruction is built on
die condemned land,— other states have concluded
that visibility, by itself, is simply not a compensable
property right.— On this issue, we can find no
generally accepted rule. We next turn to the statutory
and case law of our state.

one's property from the roadway. As a result, the
court of appeals concluded that Arby's was not
entitled to present evidence of claimed damage to
their property caused by a loss of visibility of the
property. We agree. In Utah, landowners do not have
a protected interest in the visibility of their property
from an abutting road, even if part of their land has
been taken in the process.

FN3.&?g 8,960 Square Feet v. Dep't of
Tramp. & Pub. Facilities, 806 P.2d 843,
848 (Alaska 1991) (holding that "loss of
visibility is compensable in an eminent
domain proceeding where the diminished
visibility results from changes on the
property taken from the landowner, but not
where it occurs due to changes on the
property of another."). The court of appeals
noted that even under this standard, Arby's
would not have been entitled to
compensation because the obstruction was
not built on the condemned land.
FN4. Tracy A. Batemert, Annotation,
Eminent Domain: Compensability of Loss of
Visibility of Owner's Property, 1 A.L.R.5th
113, § 2[a] (1992) ( "Where part of an
owner's land is taken for the purpose of a
public improvement pursuant to the power
of eminent domain, and the improvement of
or on the land taken results in a loss of
visibility to the owner's remaining property,
some courts have found this loss of visibility
compensable, ... while others have found
such
loss
of
visibility
not
compensable."(citations omitted)).
[3J f 12 Neither the legislature nor this court has
recognized a protected property right in visibility of

*806[4] \ 13 In Utah State Road Commission v.
Miya, we concluded that the "rights of access, light,
and air are easements appurtenant to the land of an
abutting owner on a street." 526 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah
1974). We also concluded in Miya that "[a] property
owner has no property right to a free and unrestricted
flow of traffic past his premises, and any impairment
or interference with this flow does not entitle the
owner to compensation." Id. Similarly, a property
owner has no recognized property right to free and
unrestricted visibility of his property by passing
traffic, and an impairment of that visibility does not
mandate compensation.
% 14 The speculative nature of the damages sought in
a claim for loss of visibility further supports this
conclusion. As the court of appeals correctly noted, a
claim for loss of visibility is essentially a claim for
compensation for lost business profits. Article I,
section 22 of the Utah Constitution simply does not
create a protectable property interest in the mere hope
of future sales from passing traffic.—
FN5.<See Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v.
Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 878 (Utah
1996) ("[T]o create a protectable property
interest, [one] must establish rights more
substantial than a unilateral expectation of
continued privileges.").
f 15 Because property owners have no protectable
property interest in visibility, the trial court was
correct in granting the motion in limine on this issue,
and the court of appeals was correct in affirming.
II. LOSS OF VIEW
[5][61 % 16 Unlike visibility, existing Utah law does
recognize an easement of view from one's property as
a protectable property right. Utah Code Ann. § 72-6117(5) (2001); Utah State Rd Commfn v. Miya, 526
P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1974). Severance damages
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are clearly awardable when the state condemns a
portion of land and builds a structure directly on that
condemned land, impairing the view from, and
thereby causing damage to, the non-condemned
portion of land. In Utah Department of
Transportation v. D'Ambrosio, we held that
severance damages include "those [damages] caused
by the taking of a portion of the parcel of property
where the taking or the construction of the
improvement on that part causes injury to that
portion of the parcel not taken." 743 P.2d 1220, 1222
(Utah 1987) (emphasis in original). Similarly, in
Utah Department of Transportation v. Harvey Real
Estate, we stated, "Section 78-34-10 gives a
landowner the right to present evidence of damages
caused by the construction of the improvement made
on the severed property." 2002 UT 107, If 10, 57 P.3d
1088.
If 17 We have not previously addressed a case, like
this, in which the land was condemned as part of a
single project to build a structure that would impair
the view from the remaining property, but in which
that structure was not built on the severed land. In
this case, the raised highway, which Arby's claims
damages its view, was not built in any part on the
condemned portion of Arby's land. Rather, the
condemned land was used for the construction of a
small portion of the frontage road. The frontage road
itself causes no damage to the view from Arby's
remaining land. However, according to the trial
court's findings, the land was condemned as part of
UDOPs plan to raise the highway and was therefore
condemned as part of a single project.
f 18 Whether severance damages are awardable
hinges on whether the severance of the condemned
property, and the use of that property, caused damage
to the remaining property. Utah Code section 78-3410(2) describes severance damages as those damages
"which will accrue to the portion [of property] not
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance
from the portion sought to be condemned and the
construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff" (emphasis added). This
section has no express requirement that the viewimpairing structure be built directly on the
condemned land. Rather, it only requires that the
severance damages be caused by the condemnation
o£ and use of, the property.

f 19 The court of appeals recognized this important
distinction when it concluded that Arby's was not
entitled to severance damages*807 because their
"loss of view and visibility was not caused by the
severance of its property or the construction of an
improvement thereon." Utah Dep't of Tramp v.
[vers, 2005 UT App 519, f 24, 128 P.3d 74
(emphasis added).
| 20 In Miya, Harvey Real Estate, and D'Ambrosio,
we concluded that when the state condemns a portion
of land and builds a view-impairing structure directly
on that land, the damage to the remaining property is
recoverable. This is because when the condemned
land is used for the construction of the viewimpairing structure, the damage to the remaining
property is clearly caused by the severance. However,
these cases should not be read, as the State does, to
hold that the only situation in which a partial
condemnation can cause awardable severance
damages is when the view-impairing structure is built
directly on the severed land.
[7][8] % 21 When land is condemned as part of a
single project-even if the view-impairing structure
itself is built on property other than that which was
condemned-if the use of the condemned property is
essential to the completion of the project as a whole,
the property owner is entitled to severance damages.
Logically, if the project could not be built without
taking the condemned land, the impairment of view
caused by the completion of the project could and
would not have arisen "but for" the condemnation.
This is the very essence of cause. However, if the
project could have been completed without taking the
severed land, the property owner is not entitled to
damage to his view caused by construction that takes
place entirely beyond the borders of his land. Stated
another way, the condemned land is "essential" to the
project only if its use is such a critical part of the
project that without the taking, the project could not
have been completed.
f 22 Arby's asks us to adopt the standard applied by
some other jurisdictions that "where the use of the
land taken constitutes an integral and inseparable
part of a single use ... the effect of the whole
improvement is properly to be considered" in
awarding severance damages. Andrews v. Cox, 129
Conn. 475, 29 A.2d 587, 590 (1942) (emphasis
added). We decline to adopt the "integral and
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154P.3d802
154 P.3d 802, 571 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2007 UT 19
154 P.3d 802

inseparable" language as our standard, choosing
instead to expressly limit severance damages to
situations where the condemnation and use of the
condemned land was essential to the project. We
believe this strikes the correct balance between the
property owner's rights under constitutional and
statutory law and the state's interest in its ability to
improve the highway system without being exposed
to limitless liability. This approach also best complies
with the express language of section 78-34-10.
[9] f 23 In this case, a very narrow piece of land was
taken to create a portion of a frontage road. That
condemned land appears to have had a turning lane,
curb and gutters, landscaping, and perhaps a portion
of the second of two lanes of the one-way frontage
road built on it. Under our but-for standard, we
cannot say that Arby's land was, or was not, essential
to the project. This is a factual question as yet left
unanswered by the record before us. Consequently,
remand to the trial court for that factual
determination is necessary.
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single project and that use is essential to completion
of the project. The raised highway, which blocks the
view from Arby's land, was not built on Arby's land.
However, whether the land taken from Arby's was
essential to the highway project is a factual matter not
yet resolved. Affirmed in part and remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
K 27 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice DURRANT,
Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in
Associate Chief Justice W ILK INS' opinion.
Utah,2007.
Ivers v. Utah Dept. of Transp.
154 P.3d 802, 571 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2007 UT 19
END OF DOCUMENT

f 24 If the use of Arby's condemned land was not
"essential" to the project, they are not entitled to
severance damages for loss of view from the property
under article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution or
Utah Code section 78-34-10. If it was, appropriate
damages may be awarded.
CONCLUSION
f 25 The court of appeals correctly concluded that
Arby's is not entitled to severance damages for loss of
visibility. A property owner does not have a
protectable interest in the visibility of his property
from an abutting highway. A property owner does,
however, have a protectable easement in the view
from his property,
[10] f 26 With respect to lost view, severance
damages are appropriate under Utah Code section 7834-10 where a portion of property is condemned by
the state and the condemnation of that land causes
damage to the noncondemned portion of land.
Damage to the noncondemned portion of land is
"caused" by the severance in two situations: *808 (1)
when the view-impairing structure is built on the
condemned land, or (2) when the view-impairing
structure is built on land other than the condemned
land, but the condemned land is used as part of a
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ALTER OR AMEND ORDER
and
RULING ON ARBY'S CROSS-MOTION
TO REVISE COURT'S RULING ON
UDOT'S MOTION IN LIMINE
Case No. 020700665
Judge Michael G. Allphin

This matter is before the Court on UDOT's Motion to Alter or Amend Order, and Arby's
Cross-Motion to Revise Court's Ruling on UDOTs Motion in Limine. The Court has reviewed
the moving and responding papers, along with supporting documentation, and for the reasons set
forth below, the Court GRANTS UDOT's motion, GRANTS Arby's motion in part, and
DENIES Arby's motion in part.
BACKGROUND
This case is before the Court on remand after the Utah Supreme Court determined that the
sole issue remaining in this case is whether Arby's owns a right of view. After remand, UDOT
filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude Arby's from presenting any evidence that it owns a
right of view. In that motion, UDOT claimed for the first time that it had actually obtained
Arby's right of view from deeds in 1961 and 1992.

This Court issued a ruling on the motion and denied UDOT"s motion in limine on two
grounds. First, this Court held that the motion in limine was acting as a motion to amend,
because UDOT had sought to condemn all rights appurtenant to this property, and now claims it
already owns the right of view. This was a change in the Complaint, and the Court held that the
motion to amend was untimely.
The Court also held that the owners of the land could not have foreseen in 1961 that the
road would one day become an elevated highway, and that UDOT therefore did not obtain die
right of view from the previous owners in 1961. ft was unknown whether the owners could have
known in 1992 that the road would become an elevated highway, and so the Court allowed the
parties to conduct additional discovery on the issue of foreseeability.
UDOT then filed a request to amend or alter the order. UDOT raised four different
arguments. First, UDOT claimed that it had not filed a motion to amend. Second, UDOT
claimed, again, that Arby's did not own a right of view because Utah Code Ann. § 72-1-102 does
not allow a citizen to assert a claim of view.
UDOT's third argument was based on the issue of foreseeability. UDOT noted that the
Court had relied on a California case that was distinguishable from this case, and that the Court's
reliance was misplaced. UDOT also described a large amount of evidence that it could present at
trial to show that the elevation of the highway was foreseeable in 1992, and so even if the Court's
reliance on the California case was not misplaced, UDOT argued that Arby's should still be
prevented from introducing evidence that it owned a right of view.
UDOT"s final argument was that Utah law allowed it to modify its taking at any time,
and cited Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11(2) in support of that argument.
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Arby's filed a cross-motion to revise the Court's ruling Aiby's argued that once the
Court determined that the motion m limine was an untimely motion to amend, the Court's
analysis should have been complete, and the motion m limine was properly denied Arby's
argued that the Court erred in also addressing the issue of foreseeability and in allowing the
parties to conduct additional discovery on the issue of foreseeability
Arby's did not address the statute listed by UDOT that allows UDOT to modify its taking,
and thus, to amend its complaint at any time in the proceedings
On November 30, 2007, Arby's filed a notice to submn on both motions Arby's noted
that UDOT had not filed an opposition to Arby's cross-motion UDOT did file a reply
memorandum on December 4, 2007, aftei the notice to submit had already been filed The Court
notes that the memorandum was dated on November 29, 2007, which shows that Arby's would
not have teceived it at the time Arby's filed its notice to submit Aiby's then filed another notice
to submit on Decembei 4, 2007 One week later, Arby's filed a reply memorandum in support of
its cross-motion In that reply, Arby's noted that UDOT's response was untimely and should not
be considered by the Court l
ANALYSIS
UDOT and Arby's have addressed five mam issues in their memoranda The first issue,
which was raised by UDOT, is that its motion in limine was not a motion to amend The second
issue, again raised by UDOT, is that Utah Code Ann ^ 72-1-102(11) states that no property
owner owns a i lght of view over a limited access highway The third issue is foreseeability
UDOT has argued that the Court's reliance on the Mehl case was misplaced, because that case is

The replv memorandum contained no substantn e analysis but instead only listed thiee teasons the Couit
should den> \rb^ s motion The Couit will consider Aib>'s memorandum but because it was so la^kinj; in anal>^
it ib not helpful to the Couit in making its decision and so the determination is still based almost entuely on Arb> *s
two memoianda
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distinguishable from the present case and was distinguished by the Wilson case. Arby's has
argued that the Court should not have addressed the issue of foreseeability because the motion in
limine was disposed of when the Court ruled that it was really an untimely motion to amend. The
fourth issue, raised by UDOT, is that Utah law allows UDOT to modify its taking at any time,
and so UDOT is allowed to seek to condemn a right of view and then change the complaint and
no longer to seek to condemn that appurtenant right. Finally, Arby's argued in its reply
memorandum that UDOT was not allowed to take more property than it needed for the
contemplated public use in 1961 and 1992, and since UDOT did not need to condemn the right of
view at those times, the deeds did not convey the right of view.
Each of those issues will be addressed separately below.
I,

Motion to Amend
UDOT contends once again that its motion in limine was not a motion to amend. Of

course, UDOT stated on page 2 of its its original reply memorandum in support of its motion in
limine that it was not seeking to amend the pleadings. That argument was considered by the
Court when it issued its ruling, and the Court obviously rejected this argument. It is clear that
UDOT does not agree with the Court's initial ruling on that issue, but UDOT has provided no
additional analysis to show that its motion in limine was not acting as a motion to amend, and the
Court declines to amend its initial mling based on the argument that the motion in limine was not
acting as a motion to amend.
II.

Utah Code Ann. § 72-1-102(11)
Once again, UDOT argues that Utah Code Ann. § 72-1-102(11) states that a property

owner has no claim to a right of view. That argument is incorrect, because UDOT has
consistently misread the language of the statute. The statute reads as follows: "'Limited-access
facility' means a highway especially designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to which
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neither owners nor occupants of abutting lands nor other persons have any right or easement, or
have only a limited right or easement of access, light, air, or view." Contrary to UDOT's
interpretation, the statute specifically states that landowners have a "limited right or easement of
access, light, air, or view" (emphasis added).
It is not clear why UDOT continues to raise this argument, even though it was raised on
appeal and the Utah Supreme Court apparently discounted the argument as well. The Utah
Supreme Court cited Utah Code Ann. § 72-6-117 to show that Utah law does grant an easement
of view. This Court notes that Utah Code Ann. § 72-6-117 specifically states that a highway
authority has the authority to purchase or condemn the right of view. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-6117(5). It is unknown why the legislature would grant the authority to purchase the right of view
if, as UDOT argues, the landowner has no right of view. It is also unknown why the Utah
Supreme Court would have remanded this case to determine damages for the right of view if
Arby's had no right of view over the limited-access highway.
The Court concludes that UDOT's second argument is without merit.
HL

Foreseeability
UDOT has argued that the Court's reliance on Mehl \\ Department of Public Works is

misplaced, because that case was distinguished by the case of People ex rel Dept. of Trans, v.
Wilson. UDOT's argument is correct.
In Wilson, the California Court of Appeals noted that in Mehl, the landowner expressly
wraived any claims for damages, but did not relinquish his abutter's rights, and so the court held
that the issue was whether the damages were foreseeable. 25 Cal. App. 4th 977, 981-82 (1994).
However, the landowner in Wilson had relinquished his abutter's rights, and so the Court of
Appeals ruled that foreseeability was not a basis for awarding or denying severance damages
when the landowners has relinquished abutter's rights, and that Mehl was distinguishable. Id.
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This case is factually similar to the case of Wilson, In this case, the landowner
relinquished his abutter's rights when he signed the deeds. Thus, the analysis of Wilson, rather
than Ajfe/j/, should apply, and foreseeability is not an issue in this case.
The Court's reliance on Mehl was based on a failure by the Court to recognize that Mehl
had been distinguished by Wilson. This mistake was first noted by UDOT in its motion to amend
or alter the order. The Court notes that it would have been much more helpful to the Court if
UDOT had made its argument during the initial litigation of the issue. Arby's first cited to the
case of Mehl in its memorandum in opposition to UDOT's motion in limine. Although UDOT
had cited to Wilson in its original memorandum in support of the motion in limine, and therefore
was obviously familiar with the case, UDOT failed to notify the Court in its reply memorandum
that Mehl had been distinguished by Wilson.
However, Arby's also failed to notify the Court of that fact. The Court recognizes its
error, but encourages both counsel to aid the Court in future proceedings by ensuring that all
cited case law supports their arguments and is still good law.
Arby's has also argued, in its cross-motion, that the Court erred when it addressed the
issue of foreseeability in the initial ruling. Arby's argument is correct, because in retrospect, the
Court should not have included the issue of foreseeability in the ruling (even though it was
Arby's that raised that issue, but apparently only as a fall-back defense in the event the Court did
not find that the motion to limine was an untimely motion to amend). Once the Court ruled that
the motion in limine was in reality acting as a motion to amend, the issue was properly disposed
of, and the Court should not have engaged in the foreseeability analysis.
Thus, the Court finds that it should not have addressed the issue of foreseeability in the
initial ruling, and that its reliance on Mehl was misplaced. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Arby's
cross-motion, in part.
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As noted above, the Court based its initial ruling on two factors: the motion to amend and
the issue of foreseeability. Because the foreseeability issue is resolved, the only issue remaining
in this case is the dispositive issue for the purposes of this ruling: did UDOT have the authority
to modify its take and thereby amend its complaint? Thai issue is addressed in section IV, below.
IV.

UDOT's Ability to Modify its Taking
UDOT has argued that Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11(2) gives it the authority to modify its

taking at any time after service of summons and before the jury assessment of compensation and
damages. UDOT's argument is correct. It appears that the legislature has given UDOT the
authority to change its taking at any time during the litigation, and thereby allowed UDOT to
amend its complaint at any time, without requiring that UDOT obtain leave of the Court.
The Court notes that UDOT did not raise that argument in its original motion or its reply
memorandum, and so the Court was unaware of that statute. Throughout this case, and especially
since remand, UDOT has proceeded with a strategy of "shifting theories," in which it first raises
what it believes to be winning arguments, but neglects to raise additional arguments that it
believes have merit. When the initial arguments fail, UDOT then falls back to a different theory.
This is another example of that strategy.
The Court finds that UDOTs approach of "shifting theories'' is inappropriate, and has
wasted valuable resources. As noted in its earlier ruling, this Court finds that UDOT could have
saved much time and money for both parties if it had simply discovered the deeds at the
beginning of this litigation, rather than waiting until the matter had proceeded through this Court,
the Court of Appeals, and the Utah Supreme Court. However, Arby's also had the opportunity to
discover those deeds.
As noted above, UDOT did not cite to Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11(2) until after the
Court had issued its ruling. Normally, the Court would be hesitant to consider the issue, since it
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should have been raised earlier. However, the fact remains that this statute does allow UDOT to
amend its taking, and little or nothing would be gained by allowing this matter to proceed to trial
only to have any potential judgment in favor of Arby's reversed on appeal
Because this statute allows UDOT to amend its taking, it naturally follows that UDOT
can amend the complaint at any time, and so the Court's denial of the motion in limine was
improper. Because UDOT has that authority, it can now assert that it is not seeking to condemn
the right of view, and can introduce the deeds to show that Arby's does not own a right of view,
and Arby's should be precluded from submitting any evidence that it owns a right of view.
In conclusion, because UDOT has the authority to modify its taking, it also had the
authority to no longer seek to obtain the right of view. The Court's initial ruling was incorrect,
and the Court GRANTS UDOT's motion to amend or alter the order. UDOT's original motion in
limine is also GRANTED, and Arby's is precluded from presenting evidence that it owns a right
of view for the remaining parcel.
V.

UDOT's Need to Take the Right of View
In its reply memorandum, Arby's argued that a condemning authority cannot take an

interest greater than that necessary for the contemplated use. Arby's then argued that it would
have been unnecessary for UDOT to obtain the right of view m 1961 or 1992, because UDOT
was not building an elevated highway at those times.
However, this argument essentially returns to the issue of foreseeability, because it is
unknown whether UDOT knew in 1992 that it would need to condemn the right of view because
UDOT planned to build an elevated highway in the future. As noted above, the issue of
foreseeability is not applicable to this case, because the landowner expressly relinquished his
abutter's rights when he gave the deeds to UDOT.
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CONCLUSION
The Court's reliance on Mehl on the issue of foreseeability was misplaced, and in any
case, the Court should not have addressed the issue of foreseeability in its initial ruling. Arby's
cross-motion is therefore GRANTED, in part.
UDOT's argument that it may modify its taking at any time during the litigation is
correct, and the Court therefore GRANTS UDOT's motion to amend or alter the order, and
GRANTS UDOT's motion in limine. The Court rules that Arby's is precluded from presenting
evidence that it owns a right of view for the remaining parcel.
Arby's requested that the Court sustain its initial ruling on all aspects except for the issue
of foreseeability. Because the Court's initial ruling on the issue of the motion to amend was
incorrect, the portion of Arby's motion in which it requested that the Court uphold its earlier
ruling must be DENIED.
When the Utah Supreme Court remanded this case back to this Court, the Utah Supreme
Court limited the issues to be addressed on remand. Specifically, the issue to be addressed on
remand was whether the taking of Arby's land was essential to the project, and that issue was
directly related to the issue of right of view. Given this Court's ruling that Arby's may not
present evidence that it owns a right of view, there are no other matters to be addressed by this
Court, and the case is resolved.
The Court instructs UDOT to prepare an order reflecting this ailing.

*^\v«**8fe9of 10

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON UDOT'S
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND ORDER and RULING ON RULING ON ARBY'S
CROSS-MOTION TO REVISE COURT'S RULING ON UDOT'S MOTION IN LIMINE
postage pre-paid, to the following on this date:_
Donald J. Winder
Winder and Counsel, P.C.
175 West 200 South
Suite 4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Randy Hunter
Stephen C. Ward
Office of the Attorney General
160 East 300 South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

C<7klL~

Page 10 of 10

ADDENDUM

FILED

CQpy

OCT 1 8 2007
!

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
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Case No. 020700665
Judge Michael G. Allphin

This matter is before the Court on UDOT'S Motion in Limine to Preclude Testimony that
Defendant Owns a Right of View. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers,
along with supporting documentation, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the
motion.
BACKGROUND
This case began in December 2002, when UDOT sought to condemn a portion of the
defendants'1 land and rights appurtenant to the remaining property. UDOT appraised the value of
the property and rights appurtenant at $48,250 and this amount was disputed by Arby's. The
parties stipulated to immediate occupancy, UDOT paid Arby's $48,250, and Arby's retained their
right to contest the appraisal and to seek severance damages.

The defendants will be referred to in this ruling as *4Arby Y \

UDOT then filed a motion in limine, seeking a ruling by this Court on the issue of
severance damages, and Arby's filed a motion for partial summary judgment on that same issue.
Two of the issues surrounding the determination of severance damages were the loss of visibility
and the loss of view suffered by Arby's. This Court issued a ruling on May 30, 2003. The Court
found that Arby's was not entitled to severance damages for its loss of access. The Court also
found that the loss of view in this case was caused not by something built on Arby's land, but
rather by the elevated highway, and that Arby's could not seek damages for its loss of view
caused by something built on other property. Using this same analysis, the Court also held that
Arby's could not be compensated for loss of visibility caused by the highway. The Court did find
that Arby's should be compensated for devaluation of its property. This devaluation had occurred
because the condemnation had caused the remaining property to no longer comply with zoning
requirements.
Arby's appealed the Court's ruling, but the Utah Court of Appeals initially dismissed the
appeal. On February 17, 2005, the parties entered a stipulated judgment, in which UDOT agreed
to pay Arby's $104,500, of which $48,250 had previously been paid. The remaining balance was
$56,250. Arby's expressly reserved its right to appeal the issues raised in the Court's ruling from
May 2003, and subsequently filed another appeal.
The Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's ruling. The Utah Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether severance damages should be awarded for a loss of view or
visibility when that loss is caused "by construction beyond the boundaries of the landowner's
property." hers v. UDOT, 154 P.3d 802, 803-04 (Utah 2007). The Court held that severance
damages should not be granted for loss of visibility, because no such property right exists. The
Court then noted that in this case, the condemned land was used for the constmctioii of a frontage
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road, and that the'loss of view was caused by the elevation of the highway. However, the land
was condemned as part of a single project. The Court noted that this was an issue of first
impression, and chose to apply a "but for" standard to determine whether severance damages are
appropriate in this case. If the loss of view caused by the elevation of the highway could not have
occurred but for the expansion of the frontage road, then the taking was part of one project and
severance damages could be awarded.
The Supreme Court found that it could not determine whether Arby's land was or was not
essential to the project, and remanded the case back to this Court for the purpose of determining
whether the condemned land was essential to the highway project, and if so, to determine
severance damages. See Ivers v. UDOT, 154 P.3d 802, 807 (Utah 2007).
The parties then began preparing for trial. On May 2, 2007, more than four years after the
commencement of this litigation, UDOT filed a motion in limine to preclude testimony that
Arby's owned a right of view. In that motion, UDOT stated that a state right of way had been
purchased from the owner of what is now Arby's property in 1961. As part of that purchase,
Ivers' predecessor in interest signed a deed which conveyed to the State all rights appurtenant to
the remaining parcel. The State also purchased another right of way from the owner of the
property in 1992, and the deed signed as part of that purchase also conveyed all rights
appurtenant to the remaining property.
UDOT argued that because all rights appurtenant to the remaining parcel had already
been purchased by the State, Arby's has no present claim for damages based on its loss of view
caused by the elevation of the highway. Arby's had obtained this property through a deed that
specifically stated that the transfer was subject to all rights of record, and Arby's therefore could
not have obtained the right to view for the property because that right had already been
transferred to the State.
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Arby's then filed a motion in opposition, arguing that the motion should be denied on the
following grounds. First, UDOT should not be allowed to raise this issue on remand, after the
issues have been narrowed. Second, UDOTs new theory is inconsistent with its complaint and
condemnation resolution. Third, Arby's argues that the Utah Supreme Court had recognized that
it had a right of view in the property, and that the right of way contracts used to purchase the land
and appurtenant rights in 1961 and 1992 demonstrate that the transfer was designed to convey
access rights, and did not contemplate the sale of appurtenant rights such as the right to view.
Thus, Arby's predecessor in interest was not paid for its loss of view to the remaining property in
1961. Finally, UDOT relies on deeds that conveyed rights appurtenant specifically to allow the
State to build an expressway, not an elevated road that obstructs Arby's view to a much greater
extent than a normal expressway. Thus, the later construction of an elevated road that obstructs
Arby's view was never contemplated by the parties when the 1961 and 1992 deeds were signed,
and was not foreseeable.
UDOT responded by noting that no Utah case law prevented UDOT from filing a motion
in limine after remand. UDOT noted that it was not seeking to amend its pleadings. UDOT also
argued that UDOT's attempt to condemn appurtenant rights that did not really belong to Arby's
did not create a new property interest in those rights for Arby's. UDOT concluded by stating that
Arby's had simply misunderstood the Utah Supreme Court's ruling, that the Court had never
recognized that Arby's had a right of view, and that Arby's foreseeability argument was
convoluted and disingenuous.
The parties appeared at a hearing before this Court on August 13, 2007. At that hearing,
UDOT initially explained that it had not presented these deeds at an earlier time because it
already had a "winning theory" and is now simply seeking to present a second winning theory.
After additional questioning by the Court, UDOT noted that the deeds were discovered after a
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change of counsel, when Mr. Randy Hunter caused a search for the deeds to be conducted.
Apparently, no search had been conducted prior to that time, by either party. UDOT stated that it
was prepared to stipulate that the taking was essential to the project. Both parties noted that it
wras their understanding that this Court was to first decide whether the taking was critical to the
project, and that the Court should then conduct a trial on the issue of severance damages.
ANALYSIS
As noted above, the Utah Supreme Court remanded this case to this Court to determine
whether the taking of Arby's property was essential to the project, and if so, to determine
severance damages for the loss of right to view. At the hearing on August 13, 2007, UDOT
specifically stated that it was "prepared to concede that it was necessary in looking at the project
in its entirety," and that UDOT did not think it was necessary to hold a hearing to determine
whether the taking was essential to the project. Therefore, the first issue on remand has been
resolved in favor of Arby's.
The second issue, the determination of severance damages, is not so easily resolved,
because UDOT"s motion in limine is directly relevant to that issue. The Court first notes that this
is a very difficult case. The Court has found no Utah case law that addresses a similar situation,
in which a party used one theory for over four years, and suddenly discovered new evidence that
essentially rendered much of the lengthy litigation moot. It is very unfortunate that UDOT did not
present evidence of these deeds at an earlier time in this litigation. A more timely discovery of
these deeds would doubtless have saved numerous hours of work and extensive legal fees. The
Court also notes, however, that Arby's also could have discovered these deeds, and UDOT is
therefore not entirely to blame for this waste of time and resources.
Arby's has presented four arguments to support its request that a trial be held on
severance damages and that Arby's should not be foreclosed from presenting evidence that it
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owns a right of view. The first argument is that UDOT should not be allowed to expand the
issues on remand. Second,. UDOT sought to condemn these rights, including the right of view, in
its complaint and condemnation resolution, and therefore waived its right to argue that it already
owns the right of view. Third, the Utah Supreme Court recognized Arby's right of view, and the
deeds do not show that the landowners were compensated for the loss of their right of view.
Finally, Arby's argues that the deeds were designed to convey rights of access, and the
boilerplate language used concerning appurtenant rights applied only to the construction of an
expressway, not an elevated highway, and it was not foreseeable that the right of view would
ever be limited by an elevated highway. The first two arguments will be addressed together, and
the Court will then address the third and fourth arguments together.
L

Expansion of Issues After Remand and Waiver of Claim Based on Language used in
Complaint and Condemnation Resolution
As noted by both parties at the August 13 hearing, the issue of damages must be resolved

by this Court on remand. Arby's argues that UDOT's motion in limine expands the issues on
remand. However, the motion in limine is directly related to the issue of damages, because if
there is no right to view, there can be no additional severance damages. Therefore, the motion in
limine does not improperly expand the issues beyond those which the Supreme Court remanded
back to this Court for decision.
The second argument raised by Arby's is that UDOT waived any argument that Arby's
does not own a right of view because UDOT sought to condemn that very right in its
complaint/condemnation resolution. As noted by UDOT in its reply memorandum, an attempt by
the State to condemn rights that do not belong to the landowner does not create those rights anew
for the landowner. The mention of such rights in UDOT's condemnation resolution "does not, as
[Arby's] claims, show that no such rights were acquired [from Arby's predecessors in
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interest]. . . See Morton v. State, 181 A.2d 831, 836 (N.H. 1962).
However, it is possible, as Arby's argues, that this motion in limine, and UDOT's change
of theories, constitutes an amendment of the pleadings. UDOT has clearly stated that it is not
seeking to amend its complaint, but that statement does not automatically mean that UDOT's
motion in limine does not have the same effect as a motion to amend. An amendment of
pleadings after remand is appropriate so long as the amendment does not cover issues that have
been foreclosed by the appellate court. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 181 (Utah
1986). As noted above, the motion in limine directly relates to the issue of severance damages,
and that issue was not foreclosed by the Supreme Court. Therefore, if UDOT is seeking to amend
its pleadings, such an amendment is appropriate so long as UDOT meets the requirements of
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Before conducting the Rule 15 test for amendment of pleadings, however, the Court must
first determine what UDOT alleged in its complaint and whether an amendment is even needed
in this case. In the complaint, UDOT specifically sought to acquire "all property and property
rights of the Defendants as described and set forth in [the Condemnation Resolution]. See
Complaint, ^ 4. Those rights were not specifically listed in the Condemnation Resolution.
Instead, UDOT included a description of the parcel of land, followed by the following language:
"the Owners of said entire tract of property hereby release and relinquish to said Utah
Department of Transportation any and all rights appurtenant to the remaining property of said
Owners by reason of the location thereof with reference to said highway . . . "
The use of the phrase "any and all rights appurtenant" in this case appears to be
intentionally vague and is simply a catch-all phrase designed to include all rights without going
to the trouble of actually listing what UDOT is seeking to condemn.2 However, all that is
2

UDOT used similar language in the 1961 deed, the 1992 deed, and the Condemnation Resolution.
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required in a complaint is that it must "give 'fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim
asserted and a general indication of the type of litigation involved/" Gill v. 77/ww, 720 P.2d
1352, 1353 (Utah 1986) (quoting Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1955)).
In this case, the language used by UDOT in the condemnation resolution is interpreted by
this Court as an attempt by UDOT to condemn all of the rights appurtenant to the remaining
parcel. Rights appurtenant include rights of access, light, air, and view. See Utah State Road
Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1974). It is also clear from the actions of both
parties that UDOT was seeking to condemn the right of view, as well as the other rights
appurtenant to the remaining property. UDOT litigated that issue for over four years, and it is
doubtful that UDOT would have continued to litigate the issue if it had not sought in its
complaint to condemn all of those rights, including the right of view. UDOT now presents a new
claim, and UDOT's motion in limine is therefore acting as a motion to amend the complaint.
A similar situation occurred in Call v. City of West Jordan. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986). In
that case, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance, and remanded to
give the plaintiffs an opportunity to show that the requirement placed on them by the ordinance
had no reasonable relationship to the purpose of the ordinance. Id. at 181. The trial court then
allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include a claim that the ordinance was invalid
because West Jordan had not followed the proper procedures in enacting that ordinance. Id. On
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the pleadings could be amended after remand if the issue had
not been foreclosed by the appellate court. Id. It appears that such an amendment would be
subject to Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and UDOT must show that it meets
the requirements set forth under that rule before the Court may grant UDOT's motion.
Under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a "party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served . . , " or 4<by leave of
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court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires." The court must consider at least three factors when determining whether a motion to
amend should be granted. These factors are: (A) timeliness of the motion; (B) justification for the
delay; and (C) resulting prejudice to the opposing party. Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 87
P.3d 734, 742 (Utah 2004). However, the court may also consider additional factors. Id. at 745.
A.

Timeliness
There is no bright line rule for timeliness of motions to amend. See id. at 742. In this case,

the motion in limine, acting as a motion to amend the complaint, was filed on May 2, 2007, more
than fifty-two months after the original complaint was filed on December 20, 2002.
Motions are typically untimely when they are filed very late into the litigation process.Id.
In Hill v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's denial of a motion to amend when the motion to amend was filed after a motion for
summary judgment, an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, and a second motion for summary
judgment. 920 P.2d 142, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Regardless of how far into the litigation process the motion to amend is filed, courts have
also found motions to amend to be untimely when those motions were filed several years into the
litigation. Kelly, 87 P.3d at 742-43. In Hdl, cited above, the motion to amend was denied when
the motion was filed six years after the suit was filed. Kelly, 87 P.3d at 743 (citing Hill, 920 P.2d
at 149).
In this case, the motion in limine, acting as a motion to amend, is filed both well into the
litigation process and several years into the litigation. This Court finds that this motion in limine,
acting as a motion to amend, is untimely.
B.

Justification for the Delay
The justification prong has typically been evaluated based on whether the moving party
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had prior knowledge of the events or claims it seeks to include in the amended motion, but the
presence or absence of bad faith and/or dilatory motive should also be considered by the court to
determine whether the delay was justified. Kelly, 87 P.3d at 744-45. In Kelly, the court also noted
that "unreasonable neglect in terms of pleading preparation'1 might also lead to a finding that the
delay was not justified and the motion should be denied. Id. at 745.
In this case, it is clear that UDOT did not know of the 1961 and 1992 deeds at the time it
filed its complaint. It is possible that UDOTs failure to discover these deeds while preparing its
pleadings was unreasonable neglect, but the Court notes that Arby's also failed to discover these
deeds. It is unclear whether UDOT has presented sufficient justification for its delay in amending
its complaint.
C

Prejudice
The third prong of the Rule 15(a) analysis is whether the nonmoving party would face

"unavoidable prejudice" because he/she would be forced to litigate an issue for which he/she has
not had time to prepare, hi at 743. The fact that the nonmoving party might have to conduct
additional discovery is insufficient to show that the trial court should deny the motion to amend.
Id
In this case, UDOT presented the issue months before any scheduled trial date. Arby^s
has not faced "unavoidable prejudice".
D.

Conclusion
Arby's will not face unavoidable prejudice if UDOT is allowed to amend its complaint. It

is also not clear that UDOT"s delay in amending its complaint was unjustified. However, it is
clear that the motion in limine, acting as a motion to amend, was filed well into the litigation
process, and more than four years after the original complaint was filed. Although the court
should use a multi-factored approach in ruling on a motion to amend, **a court's ruling on a
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motion to amend can be predicated on only one or two of the particular factors." hi at 746
(internal citations omitted). Because the motion in limine, acting as a motion to amend, was
untimely, this Court denies the motion.
IL

Payment for Appurtenant Rights and Foreseeability
Arby's also argues that there is no indication that Arby's predecessor in interest was paid

for the sale of appurtenant rights, and that when the 1961 and 1992 deeds were granted to the
State, it was not foreseeable that the highway would one day become elevated and infringe even
more dramatically on the landowner's right of view.
It is true that the deeds and contracts show no separate payment or other consideration for
the transfer of appurtenant rights. However, it is clear from the language of the two deeds that
Arby's predecessors in interest intended to convey those appurtenant rights. "[T]he main object
in construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the parties, especially that of the grantor, from
the language used*" Hartman v. Potter, etal, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979) (emphasis in
original). If a deed's language is plain and unambiguous, "parol evidence is not admissible to
vary its terms . .." and "the intention of the parties to a conveyance is open to interpretation only
when the words used are ambiguous." Id.
Just as this Court finds that the language used in the Condemnation Resolution meant that
UDOT sought to condemn all of the rights appurtenant to the parcel, the language used in the
1961 and 1992 deeds, which is almost identical to the language used in the Condemnation
Resolution, meant that the grantor intended to convey "any and all rights or easements
appurtenant to the remaining property of said Owners. .." The language used was not ambiguous,
and the intentions of the parties is therefore not open to interpretation. Arby's predecessors in
interest intended to convey the appurtenant rights of the remaining parcel.
However, Arby's might be correct in claiming that when the grantors signed the deeds, it
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was not foreseeable that the at-grade highway would one day become an elevated highway. In
Mehl v. Department of Public Works, the Supreme Court of California held that "[\\]hene\er an
owner of land has consented by deed to the taking of his property for public use, it is assumed he
has been compensated for all reasonably foreseeable damages to the property that could result
from the taking and public use." 532 P.2d 489, 492 (Cai. 1975) (emphasis added) (internal
citation omitted). However, if the damage was not foreseeable, as was the case in Mehl, the
landowner may be paid damages for the unforeseeable harm. Id. at 492-93.
It is impossible for this Court to determine whether the damage to the landowner's right
of view was foreseeable. It is likely that such an elevated highway was not foreseeable in 1961,
more than forty years before this condemnation action, but it is possible that the grantor had
knowledge of a future elevated highway in 1992. The Court therefore declines to rule that the
damage was foreseeable, but also declines to rule that it was not foreseeable. The parties are fiee
to conduct additional discovery as to this issue and present additional evidence at trial.
CONCLUSION
UDOT originally sought to condemn "any and all rights appurtenant" to Arby's remaining
property. It is clear to this Court that this language included the right of view. UDOT's
subsequent actions in this litigation also demonstrate that UDOT was seeking to condemn Arby's
right of view. UDOT's motion in limine to preclude testimony that Arby's owns a right of view
is therefore acting as a motion to amend the complaint. Because this motion was filed more than
four years into the litigation, and after a lengthy appeals process, the Court denies the motion and
Arby's is not precluded from presenting evidence that it owns a right of view.
The language of the deeds is plain and unambiguous, and the Court finds that Arby's
predecessors in interest intended to convey all rights appurtenant to the remaining property when
they signed deeds in 1961 and 1992. The damage to the right of view was likely not foreseeable
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in 1961, but it is possible that the grantor in 1992 knew of the possibility that the highway would
one day become an elevated highway. The Court therefore finds that both parties may conduct
additional discovery on that issue and may present evidence of foreseeability or lack of
foreseeability at trial
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
ORDER
Plaintiff,

vs.
JAMES 1VERS; KATHERJNE G, HAVAS;
P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant); and
ZIONS CREDIT CORPORATION,

Civil No. 020700665
Judge Michael Aliphin

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend the
Court's prior Order and the eross-motion of the Defendants to revise the Court's prior ruling on
the Plaintiffs Motion in Limine,

VW42O7802

020700665 lVER$,JAMES

The Court grants the Plaintiffs motion and also grants a portion of the Defendant's
motion but also denies the Defendant's motion in part.
The parties in their respective motions and supporting memoranda addressed multiple
issues, A full discussion of these issues is contained in the Court's Ruling of February 5,2008,
That Ruling is incorporated into this order. Based on the reasons contained in that Ruling, the
Court now orders that UDOT has a right to modify its taking to remove appurtenant rights and
therefore orders that the Court's previous order is altered in that UDOT can now modify its
current taking to exclude rights appurtenant,
UDOT's original Motion in Limine is granted, and Atby's is hereby precluded from
presenting evidence that it owns a compensable right of view from the remaining parcel
UDOT's argument that it may modify its taking at any time during the litigation is
correct, and the Court therefore GRANTS UDOT's motion to amend or alter the order, and
grants UDOT's Motion in Limine, treating it as having the effect of a motion to modify. The
Court orders that Arby's is precluded from presenting evidence that it owns a right of view from
the remaining parcel.
The Court's reliance on Mehl on the issue of forcseeability was misplaced, Arby's crossmotion is therefore GRANTED, in part
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Arby's requested that the Court sustain its initial ruling on all aspects except for the issue
of foresceability< Because the Court's initial ruling on the issue of the motion to amend was
incorrect, tlic portion of Arby*s motion in which it requested that the Court uphold its earlier
ruling must be DENIED.

*>

Given this Court's ruling, the Court orders that Arby's may not present evidence that it
owns a right of view, there are no other matters to be addressed by this Court, and the case is
resolved,
DATED this ^ * d a y of March, 2008,
BY THE COURT:

:HAEL/^LLPHIi
District Court Judge
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage
prepaid, this SLUL day of March, 2008, to:
John W.Holt
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Attorney for James I vers,
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175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
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